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Data visualizations combine numeric data with visual representation, and 
these modes allow them to express certain kinds of knowledge more easily 
than others. This chapter uses examples of historical data visualizations 
in order to examine what ways of knowing they privilege. What is the 
di!ference between the spatial organization of tools in prehistoric homes 
and a photograph or bar chart showing information about the same tools, 
in terms of the kinds of knowledge they enable? How do the systems for 
gathering and visualizing data during the 18th and 19th centuries shape 
our understanding of the world? How do data visualizations make us feel 
that they are objective? How do they shape our ideas of what is possible?
Keywords: Dataism; God trick; Desire for numbers; Correlation and 
causation; The sublime; Epistemology of data visualization
Introduction
Data visualizations combine at least two modes of representation: numerical 
data and visual diagrams. For a computer program to be able to process data, 
it has to be converted to numbers, to the zeros and ones of machine code. 
In addition, the data need to be visually organized, which often requires 
dividing them into discrete quantities where lines, size, spatial placement, 
and other visual elements show certain patterns in the data. Each of these 
two modes of expression, the numeric and the visual, carries its own af-
fordances and constraints for what they can express.
This anthology has several chapters that use concrete examples to 
discuss how data visualizations can be biased in their representations of 
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data (Ricker, Kraak, & Engelhardt, this volume; D’Ignazio & Bhargava, this 
volume) or how data visualizations can work against the typical abstrac-
tion they entail to include individuals’ stories (Alamalhodaei, Alberda, & 
Feigenbaum, this volume). My emphasis in this chapter is on examining 
the underlying mechanisms of data visualizations as an assemblage of data 
and visualizations. My exploration sits alongside existing critical work on 
data visualizations in feminist scholarship (D’Ignazio & Klein, 2016; Hill, 
Kennedy, & Gerrard, 2016), in the digital humanities (Drucker, 2011, 2014; 
Gitelman, 2013), and in critical algorithm studies and other scholarship on 
the epistemological basis for algorithmic processing of big data (Eubanks, 
2018; Gillespie & Seaver, 2015; Noble, 2018).
Visual organization
Organizing objects visually and spatially is something humans and our 
ancestors have done for a long time. In her essay ‘Visualizing Thought’, 
Barbara Tversky describes how hominins living three-quarters of a million 
years ago organized their tools and belongings in di!ferent areas of their 
home. She argues that this is the basic precursor to any kind of visualization: 
‘Perhaps the simplest way to use space to communicate is to arrange or 
rearrange things in it. An early process is grouping things in space using 
proximity, putting similar things in close proximity and farther from dis-
similar things’ (Tversky, 2010, p.'504). We might extend Tversky’s line of 
reasoning to the modern domestic habit of keeping forks in one partition 
of a kitchen drawer and knives in another, and argue that this is a way of 
visually and spatially communicating information about the forks and 
knives.
The data visualizations we see on computer screens or printed pages, or 
even early markings on stones or in the sand, are one step removed from the 
phenomena they represent or organize. If we walk into somebody’s kitchen 
and open a drawer, we see the knives and forks in the kitchen drawer, but 
we also experience them in space, and we can touch them and pick them 
up. Now, imagine a data visualization about kitchen utensils on a screen. 
It could be very simple, showing the number of knives and forks and other 
utensils in a kitchen, perhaps organized as a bar chart, perhaps using little 
pictures of forks stacked up in one bar and knives in another to show the 
relative quantities. Or imagine a photograph of the kitchen drawer, or an 
Instagram-style ( )at lay photograph of all the knives and forks neatly laid 
out on a table and photographed from above.
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Once the knives and forks are transferred from spatially organized objects 
to a visual representation on a two-dimensional surface, our distance from 
them increases. We interpret them as separate from us. A photograph of 
the drawer might not encourage a great deal of analytical dissection of 
the image, but the neatly organized ( )at lay photograph and the bar graph 
prioritize an analytic approach to that which is represented.
In his in()uential book about the transition from oral to literate cultures, 
Walter Ong (1982) argues that a fundamental di!ference between orality and 
literacy is that the visual nature of writing leads to ideas of objectivity that 
are impossible in oral culture. When we speak to each other in a face-to-face 
conversation, we are immersed in the sound, and because the speakers are 
in the same physical space, face-to-face oral discourse tends to be situated 
and concrete. Writing, on the other hand, separates the knower from the 
known. There is a distance between reader and writer. ‘Sight isolates’, Ong 
writes, while ‘sound incorporates. Whereas sight situates the observer outside 
what he views, at a distance, sound pours into the hearer’ (1982, p.'45). A 
typical visual ideal is clarity and distinctness, a taking apart, Ong argues, 
whereas the auditory ideal, by contrast, is harmony, a putting together 
(p.'71). He writes: ‘A sound-dominated verbal economy is consonant with 
aggregative (harmonizing) tendencies rather than with analytic, dissecting 
tendencies (which would come with the inscribed, visualized word: vision 
is a dissecting sense)’ (p.'73).
Ong does not discuss visualizations or diagrams, but following his 
reasoning, we can see a similar transition from the spatial organization of 
objects to the visual representation of objects on a page or other ()at surface. 
Think back to the drawer of knives and forks as a way of organizing data: 
when there are real knives and real forks, the human is able to pick up a 
knife or a fork, move them around, manipulate them. Touch, like sound, 
involves closeness and participation. But the moment we switch from a 
physical drawer to a visual representation of a drawer, we are placed outside 
the representation, as analytical observers who feel an objective distance 
from what is seen. At least, this is true if we follow Ong, and not all would: 
Jonathan Sterne, for instance, criticizes Ong’s framework as too simple a 
binary, too closely based on theological distinctions about the meaning of 
‘the word’, and too little grounded in existing anthropological research on 
oral and literate cultures (Sterne, 2011). But whether or not Ong’s framework 
is too simplistic, the basic idea that visual representation can lead to a more 
analytic approach is also expressed by other scholars coming from very 
di!ferent angles. Tversky also emphasizes analysis as key in visualization, 
but for her it is the persistence of images, that is, that they are not ( )eeting 
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like the spoken word, that allows the ‘perceptual processes’ to occur that 
are needed for ‘understanding, inference, and insight’:
Because [images] persist, they can be subjected to myriad perceptual 
processes: Compare, contrast, assess similarity, distance, direction, shape, 
and size, reverse * +gure and ground, rotate, group and regroup; that is, 
they can be mentally assessed and rearranged in multiple ways that 
contribute to understanding, inference, and insight. (Tversky, 2010, p.'500)
Systematizing data
Importantly, not only the visual, but also the data themselves share much 
of this promise of analytical objectivity. Data visualization had a golden age 
in the nineteenth century, at the same time as nation states began large-
scale collection of statistical data (Friendly, 2006). However, it began a few 
centuries earlier, at the same time as the scienti* +c method was developing, 
and with it the idea that humans could precisely observe the world and use 
those observations to understand it. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
Europe saw an increasing trend towards observation, measurement, and 
quanti* +cation, and di!ferent * +elds developed new ways of measuring and 
quantifying things that had not previously been seen as interesting. Some 
of these methods were technological. For instance the invention of the 
telescope allowed Galileo to make observations about the solar system 
that would not previously have been possible. In our time, the existence 
of precise sensors and of computers that can process massive amounts of 
data allows for certain types of measurement, analysis, and visualization 
that were not possible a few decades ago.
Social and organizational changes also led to new kinds of quanti* +cation. 
National registries became common during the nineteenth century, for 
instance, allowing for analysis of trends over time or the comparison of 
di!ferent regions. For example, the * +rst centralized national system of 
crime reporting was instituted in France in 1825, and collected information 
about all charges made in French courts on a quarterly basis (Friendly, 2006, 
p.'25). More and more information was collected, and by the end of the 
nineteenth century the French police not only had detailed statistics about 
crimes, but also systems for documenting and identifying criminals and 
suspects using a system of ‘anthropometrics’, devised by Alphonse Bertillon 
and involving very speci* +c measurements of body parts (Kember, 2014). 
Once one has such a system, once it is possible to gather data that appears 
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to give us knowledge, we end up with what Helen Kennedy calls a ‘desire 
for numbers’ that can lead to a lack of critical re( )ection about what those 
numbers mean and whether we truly need them (2016, p.'51).
This sense that systematized data have authority is an important aspect 
of the rhetorical power of data visualizations. While Ong and Tversky 
emphasized the visual as allowing for an analytical and perhaps objective 
stance, many have argued that it is the data themselves, or the quantitative 
nature of data visualizations, that lend them this sense of authority.
A perception of objectivity
According to Anthony McCosker and Rowan Wilken (2014), data visualiza-
tions often o!fer a ‘fantasy of knowing’ or of ‘total knowledge’, or in Donna 
Haraway’s words, they claim to present a ‘God’s eye view’ (Haraway, 1988, 
p.'581). The use of a data visualization in a newspaper article or a corporate 
report carries with it a rhetorical weight: the simple presence of the data 
visualization seems to state ‘Look, we have data. This is true’ (see Tal, Aner, 
& Wansink, 2016 on data visualization’s association with truthfulness).
José van Dijck uses the term dataism to describe the ideology of big data, 
which is characterized by ‘a widespread belief in the objective quanti* +ca-
tion and potential tracking of all kinds of human behavior and sociality 
through online media technologies’ (2014, p.'198). Epistemologically, data 
visualizations build upon this trust in data.
We can trace many histories of society’s growing trust in numbers. The 
registration of data about crimes and criminals mentioned above tells 
of one such history, which can be traced forwards to today’s bodycams, 
surveillance, and biometrics (Gates, 2011). Another, parallel history is that 
of the transition from midwives and their home-based care of mothers 
and infants to the increasing medicalization of prenatal care. This story 
can be told as a transfer of power from women to men, but it can also be 
seen as a transfer of trust from humans to machines, as the increasing 
institutionalization of prenatal and infant care included a radical growth 
in the use of technology to monitor growth and health (Oppenheimer, 
2013). Today, iPhone apps connect to digital scales that generate daily data 
visualizations of a baby’s weight (Rettberg, 2014, p.'67) and smart socks 
generate continuous visualizations of a baby’s heartbeat (Leaver, 2017).
The management of birth is one thread in this story of numbers. Another 
thread is the management, or perhaps rather the marketing, of instruments 
of death, as told by Donald Mackenzie in Inventing Accuracy: A Historical 
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Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (1993). Or we might consider the 
prevention of life, a thread of the story told by Michelle Murphy in The 
Economization of Life (2017), where she discusses how demographic models 
comparing population size and * +nancial growth created programmes 
intended to improve the future economies of developing countries through 
extensive birth control and abortion programmes.
The average as norm
Displaying data visually rather than as a table of numbers is a powerful 
method for * +nding patterns in the data. Some patterns recur in many 
di!ferent datasets, such as the bell-shaped curve seen in Figure'2.1, a graph 
showing the heights of Belgian men, which follows what is mathematically 
known as a normal distribution. Writing in the 1860s, Adolphe Quetelet 
interpreted this recurrence as evidence of a fundamental social law, and 
de* +ned the central portion of the curve as ‘normal’, with those outside 
the normal zone seen as aberrations (1997). Sekula explains that ‘[t]hus 
conceived, the “average man” constituted an ideal, not only of social health, 
but of social stability and of beauty’ (1986, p.'22). Quetelet’s work leaned 
heavily upon data visualizations. He * +rst showed his data in the form of 
a table, then showed it visualized, drawing conclusions from the patterns 
that became apparent when the numbers were shown as curves on an 
x- and y-axis.
The power of visualizations to show averages and patterns contributed to 
the nineteenth-century privileging of the ‘norm’, or as Lennard Davis argues, 
a ‘generalized notion of the normal as an imperative’, where ‘the average 
then paradoxically becomes a kind of ideal, a position to be wished’ (Davis, 
2013, p.'2). This privileging of the average is a marked break from earlier 
traditions that saw the ideal body, represented for instance in paintings of 
Venus, as something ‘mytho-poetical’, a ‘divine body’ that is ‘not attainable 
by a human’ (Davis, 2013, p.'2).
As it turns out, the average human doesn’t exist. Yes, that even curve 
shape shown in Figure'2.1 does show up again and again when you measure 
almost any aspect of humans—or of most things, really. But that doesn’t 
mean that any individual human is ‘average’. In her book Technically Wrong 
(2017), Sara Wachter-Boettcher tells the story of how the adjustable seatbelt 
was designed. Prior to its invention, the air force planned to design cockpits 
that * +t ‘the average pilot’—but they discovered that none of their pilots 
were of average size in all the ten dimensions they measured, such as height, 
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wrist circumference, and shoulder width. Wachter-Boettcher uses this point 
to argue that it’s important to design technology that * +ts people at each 
extreme rather than for the average person, as the air force did by creating 
adjustable seats and seat belts (Wachter-Boettcher, 2017). The idea of ‘the 
average’ may be encouraged by data visualizations, but that doesn’t mean 
that it’s necessarily the most useful way of viewing the data.
Correlation is easier than causation
Computers are extremely good at * +nding correlations. In fact, this is one of 
the mainstays of current models of deep machine learning, where software 
is fed ‘big data’ and works through it to * +nd patterns. By analysing historical 
data, computers can * +nd patterns that allow them to predict future behav-
iour. Often these predictions are eerily accurate. In some tests, AI systems 
do a better job at medical diagnosis than human doctors (Olson, 2018). It is 
wise to remember, though, that many stakeholders have a strong * +nancial 
interest in convincing the general public that AI is e!* +cient, perhaps more 
e!* +cient than humans, and AI’s ability to make accurate predictions is 
often overstated.
Visualizations of data also prioritize correlation over causation. They 
show patterns and relative size or position, but it is more di!* +cult to show 
Figure!2.1. The height of Belgians from 18 to 20 years. Reprinted from Physique sociale ou Essai sur 
le développement des facultés de l’homme (p.)355), by A. Quetelet, 1997 [1869], Brussels: Académie 
Royale de Belgique. Copyright 1997 by Académie Royale de Belgique. Reprinted with permission.
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causality. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier argue in their 
book Big Data (2013) that we no longer need causality. If we can predict 
how likely patients are to take their medicine based on their car insurance 
payment history, why would we want or need to know why they don’t take 
their medicine, Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier ask. Obviously their pay-
ment history doesn’t cause their tendency to take or not take medicines as 
prescribed. But it no longer matters. Causality for them is simply ‘human 
intuiting’ that doesn’t deepen our insight, it is merely a ‘cognitive shortcut 
that gives us the illusion of insight but in reality leaves us in the dark about 
the world around us’ (2013, p.'64). Others are more concerned about the 
downplay of causality, as Wendy Chun writes: ‘Big data […] o!fers a form of 
cognitive mapping that allegedly sees all, by ignoring causes’ (2017, p.'56).
Di!ferent forms of representation emphasize di!ferent relationships 
and patterns. Quetelet’s data visualizations contributed to the idea of the 
average as something to be sought after, whereas earlier forms of repre-
sentation, such as paintings, were well-suited to representing ideal beauty 
as something beyond human perfection. Data visualizations prioritize 
correlation. Narrative, by contrast, is a form of representation that often 
emphasizes causal connections. Narratives organize events in time. Some 
also provide causal connections between the events. E. M. Forster argues 
that such connections separate a story, which is just events in time (‘and 
then, and then’), from a plot, which adds causality. ‘“The king died and then 
the queen died,” is a story. “The king died, then the queen died of grief” is a 
plot,’ Forster wrote (1949, p.'82). Roland Barthes, on the other hand, argued 
that ‘the mainspring of narrative’ is the reader’s assumption that an event 
that happens after another event is caused by the * +rst event, meaning that 
‘narrative would be a systematic application of the logical fallacy […] post hoc, 
ergo propter hoc’ (1977, p.'94). Causation is not always evident, but di!ferent 
forms of representation emphasize causation or correlation in di!ferent 
ways. Visualizations do not usually portray narratives, although this is 
certainly possible, as discussed by Wibke Weber and others in this volume.
One important extension of the correlation/causation binary is that the 
algorithmic processing of data that lies behind data visualizations often use 
proxies. Often, we cannot measure the things we are really interested in, so 
we * +nd something that we can measure and that we assume has a direct 
relationship to the thing we actually want to understand. For instance, we 
don’t have a way of directly measuring human emotions. Yet developers, or 
at least the marketers of their products, appear con* +dent that using machine 
vision algorithms to analyse facial expressions can tell us that somebody is 
99% angry and 0.5% sad, for instance. In this case, the facial expressions are 
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proxies that are presumed to correlate perfectly with a person’s emotions, 
although this assumption builds upon psychological theories that were 
arguably outdated decades ago (Bjørnsten & Zacher Sørensen, 2017). We 
measure what we can measure and make claims based on that.
In other cases, maybe data could have been measured, but they were not, 
and so the datasets are incomplete. Machine learning can * +nd correlations 
that appear to be valid in imperfect datasets. A useful example, discussed by 
economist Sendhil Mullainathan and medical researcher Ziad Obermeyer, 
demonstrates how machine learning in healthcare, despite excelling at 
‘predicting outcomes y based on inputs x’, can lead to misleading or biased 
predictions. This is because inputs such as medical records and insurance 
claim data su!fer from ‘large and systematic mismeasurement’ (2017, p.'476). 
They give the example of predictors for having a stroke. It is often di!* +cult to 
tell if patients arriving at a hospital are at risk of having a stroke, so a team 
used machine learning to analyse historical patient data in order to * +nd 
factors in their medical history that are predictors of likelihood of having 
a stroke. On the surface, such a ‘prediction problem’ doesn’t need to prove 
causal connections, since the goal is simply to plan for a more e!* +cient use of 
resources, allocating more resources to patients with a higher risk of having 
a stroke. But although the machine learning algorithm had a lot of patient 
data, it did not have all the necessary data, because a lot of information 
about patients does not end up in their medical journals. The algorithm 
found that statistically valid predictors for having a stroke included having 
been treated for a minor injury due to a fall, or for acute sinusitis, or having 
had a scan for colon cancer. Upon closer inspection, human researchers 
found that the minor injuries and scans were in fact proxies for patients who 
were likely to go to the doctor for relatively minor issues. These patients 
were more likely than the general population to have a stroke diagnosed 
by a doctor, though not necessarily more likely to actually have a stroke, 
as many strokes are not diagnosed. Such skewed data can easily end up in 
well-intended data visualizations.
Phantasmagrams and a!fect
Sometimes, data visualizations are used to make predictive claims or argu-
ments that can shape our understanding of the world. This can happen in a 
conceptual manner, as when Quetelet used data visualizations to develop 
the idea of the average as ideal, or in a more concrete way, as when a data 
series shows an increase or a decrease and the visualization suggests that this 
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trend will continue into the future. This predictive use of data visualization 
is becoming more automated in systems such as those o!fered by Palantir 
and other companies for risk prediction. For instance, in predictive policing, 
police departments have a live map of their district with percentages and 
colour codes showing places where there is a high risk of certain crimes 
occurring, based on data analysis of past crimes as well as data such as local 
weather reports and the school calendar. When data visualizations make 
claims about the future, they can also a!fect the future, and we should be 
wary of how they do so.
Michelle Murphy has used the term phantasmagram to describe the 
way that 20th-century economic and demographic models became not just 
descriptions of how the world works, but projections that lived lives of their 
own. She compares them to the phantasmagoria of the nineteenth century, 
‘ghostly simulations made by whirling magic lanterns that stimulated 
fright and awe’ (Murphy, 2017, p.'53). She argues that demographic models 
are phantasmagrams, models that created new ways of seeing the world:
Through the work of Keynes and other similarly minded macroeconomists, 
the national economy was explicated as a new aggregate kind, a collective 
blur of activity that nonetheless could be modeled as a set of predictable 
correlations, tendencies, forces, and rates representable in equations and 
graphs. When interest rates go up, investment goes down, employment 
drops, output falls. With equations and diagrams, mathematical modelling 
in the 1930s performatively discerned ‘the economy’ as a constellation of 
such interrelationships within a closed system whose boundary was the 
nation-state. (Murphy, 2017, p.'18)
The very idea of it being possible to measure the entire economic perfor-
mance of a country as its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a phantasmagram, 
Murphy argues, which will always leave things out (unpaid labour, for 
instance) and miscount other components. GDP is an example of ‘quantita-
tive practices that are enriched with a!fect, propagate imaginaries, lure 
feeling, and hence have supernatural e!fects in surplus of their rational 
precepts’ (2017, p.'24). The success of such a model lay ‘not in its empirical 
veracity but in the way it gave form to a technocratic dream of a national 
macroeconomy that could be fostered, directed, and triggered by rearranging 
reproduction en mass,’ Murphy argues (2017, p.'51).
We are used to thinking of quantitative models or visualizations as 
objective and rational. This is what José van Dijck calls dataism, as noted 
above. For Murphy to instead highlight the a!fect and even the sublime 
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of economic models (2017, pp.'9, 23) is a very di!ferent approach that may 
seem at odds with our everyday experience of models, graphs, and other 
data visualizations. Perhaps, as Helen Kennedy and Rosemary Hill note, it 
is the very combination of the ‘statistical and visual’ in data visualizations 
that leads to their emotional impact (2017, p.'831). Kennedy and Hill discuss 
a range of emotional responses that participants in their focus groups 
expressed when looking at data visualizations. Here, I will discuss the sense 
of the sublime that Murphy touches upon.
The sublime is an old concept, used * +rst by Longinus around 2000 
years ago. For Longinus, the sublime was a rhetorical technique used in 
a speech to ‘overcome the rational powers’ of an audience (Longinus, 100 
CE/1935). While Longinus theorized the sublime as a rhetorical technique 
for in( )uencing people, Kant saw it as a human response to grandeur in 
art or nature. His concept of the mathematical sublime is awakened in us 
when we sense something that is absolutely large: it isn’t of a speci* +c size, 
it is great without comparison, so we can’t grasp it mathematically. The 
sublime, for Kant, lies not in the object but in our experience of it. If you 
gaze at the night skies, or consider undying love or loyalty, then you may 
experience the sublime. Combining Kant and Murphy’s ideas, then, we 
might say that the vastness of the idea of GDP, of being able to compute 
and visualize all the economy of all the world, also awakens this sense of 
the sublime.
The pleasure of the sublime, Kant writes, lies in the sense that our mind 
is broadened by this experience of the in* +nite that allows us to ‘pass beyond 
the narrow con* +nes of sensibility’ (2007, p.'256). This sounds close to the 
reaction that designer Jer Thorp says he aims for when he designs a data 
visualization: ‘First, it needs to be visually pleasing. I want people to say 
‘Oooh…!’ when they turn the page to it. Once they’re hooked, though, I want 
them to learn something—the ‘Aaah!’ moment’ (2010). The initial pleasure 
should give way to rational understanding. Although some have criticized 
the obsession with the visual beauty of data visualizations (McCosker & 
Wilken, 2014), Kant’s idea of the sublime as something that can lead to a 
deeper understanding can also be seen as aligned with ideas of embodied 
knowledge and the role of emotions and the senses in knowledge. A!fect 
and emotion can o!fer us kinds of knowledge that are not directly accessible 
through purely rational analysis.
Data visualizations are not simply visual and they are not simply quantita-
tive. They are a form of communication that emphasizes data. Sometimes it 
is the very fact that they present reality as understandable and predictable 
through data models that makes data visualizations so convincing.
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